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Construction Law
by Frank 0. Brown, Jr.*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article focuses on noteworthy construction law decisions by
Georgia appellate and federal district courts in Georgia between June 1,
2011 and May 31, 2012.'
II.

MEASURE OF DAMAGES

The opinion in Royal CapitalDevelopment, LLC v. Maryland Casualty
Co.2 has already been cited by plaintiffs in construction defects suits for
the proposition that both repair costs and residual diminution in value
can be recovered.' The insured sued its property insurer for both repair
costs and post-repair diminution in value to a commercial building
resulting from construction activity on adjacent property.4 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit asked the Georgia
Supreme Court to decide the following question of law:
For an insurance contract providing coverage for "direct physical loss
of or damage to" a building that allows the insurer the option of paying
either "the cost of repairing the building" or "the loss of value," if the
insurer elects to [ I repair the building, must it also compensate the

* Shareholder in the firm ofWeissman, Nowack, Curry & Wilco, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia.
General Counsel for Greater Atlanta Home Builders Association, Inc. Rhodes College (B.A.,
1976); Emory University School of Law (J.D., 1979). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of Georgia construction law during the prior survey period, see
Frank 0. Brown, Jr., ConstructionLaw, Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 63 MERcER L. REV.
107 (2011).
2. 291 Ga. 262, 728 S.E.2d 234 (2012).
3. E.g., Ingles Markets, Inc. v. Kempler, 730 S.E.2d 444 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).
4. Royal CapitalDev., 291 Ga. at 263, 728 S.E.2d at 235.
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insured for the diminution in value of the property resulting from
stigma due to its having been physically damaged?'
The Georgia Supreme Court answered in the affirmative.'
Further framing the issue before it, the court stated,
The primary issue presented to this Court is whether our ruling in
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mabry, 274 Ga. 498, 556 S.E.2d 114
(2001), a case involving an automobile insurance policy wherein we

held that a provision requiring the insurer to pay for loss to the
insured's car required the insurer to also pay for any diminution in
value of the repaired vehicle, is applicable.7
The court held that Mabry was not limited by the type of property
insured and applies to property insurance for real property s The court
reasoned that its holding was consistent with the general Georgia rule
that a plaintiff is entitled to "full recovery."9 Elaborating, it stated that
in "unusual" circumstances, real property may suffer diminished value
associated with the stigma of having been damaged even after it has
been repaired. ° It did not clarify which circumstances are "unusual.""

III.

LIABiLiTY INSURANCE

The opinion in Estate of Pitts v. City of Atlanta 2 is important to both
drafters of construction contracts and litigation counsel. During an
airport construction project, a subcontractor's employee was fatally
struck by a truck driven by an employee of a sub-subcontractor. The
estate of the subcontractor's employee got a judgment against the subsubcontractor and its employee, which exceeded
the sub-subcontractor's
3
automobile liability insurance coverage.1
Then, the estate sued the City of Atlanta and the general contractors,
alleging that they failed to require the sub-subcontractor to maintain
$10 million in automobile liability insurance as required by both the
general contract and the subcontract. Had they required that level of

5.
1050,
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 262, 728 S.E.2d at 235; Royal Capital Dev. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 659 F.3d
1051 (11th Cir. 2011).
Royal CaptialDev., 291 Ga. at 267, 728 S.E.2d at 238.
Id. at 263, 728 S.E.2d at 235.
Id.
Id. at 265, 728 S.E.2d at 237.
Id. at 263-65, 728 S.E.2d at 236-37.
See id.
312 Ga. App. 599, 719 S.E.2d 7 (2011), cert. granted.
Id. at 599-600, 719 S.E.2d at 9-10.
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insurance, the estate argued, the14judgment against the sub-subcontractor
would have been fully satisfied.
The defendants responded that the estate's decedent was not a thirdparty beneficiary of the general contract or subcontract, and, therefore,
it lacked standing to assert a breach of the minimum insurance
requirement.15 On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals acknowledged
that the estate's decedent was not named as a third-party beneficiary in
either of those contracts." However, it held that the decedent was
nevertheless an intended beneficiary. 7 It drew that conclusion because
the City's "Owner's Controlled Insurance Program," which was made a
part of the general contract and incorporated into the subcontract, stated
that its purpose was "to provide one master insurance program that
provides broad coverages with high limits that will benefit all participants involved in the project."" The court reasoned that the decedent
was a "participant" as that term is commonly understood.' 9
The opinion in Illinois Union Insurance Co. v. NRI Construction,
Inc.20 addresses two important aspects of the relationship between
insurer and insured under a commercial general liability policy. One
was an issue of first impression-that is, the right of the insurer to
recover defense costs from the insured in the absence of a specific policy
provision allowing such recovery when it has been judicially determined
that the insurer had no obligation to defend.2' The United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia held where the
insurer has expressly notified the insured of that right in a reservation
of rights letter and the insured has accepted the insurer-provided
defense without objection, the insurer may recover defense costs from the
insured based on either unjust enrichment or implied-in-fact contract.22
The second issue addressed by the court was the timeliness of notice
of a potential claim by the insured.23 The insured was a general
contractor. An employee or individual sub-subcontractor of the insured's
subcontractor suffered injury from a ladder fall. Almost two years later,

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 600, 719 S.E.2d at 10.
Id. at 603, 719 S.E.2d at 11-12.
Id. at 603, 719 S.E.2d at 12.
Id. at 603-05, 719 S.E.2d at 12-13.
Id. at 603, 719 S.E.2d at 12 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 604, 719 S.E.2d at 12.
846 F. Supp. 2d 1366 (N.D. Ga. 2012).
Id. at 1373-74.
Id. at 1377.
Id. at 1369-70.
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the injured individual sued the general contractor, who then first
notified the insurer of the suit.2'
After initially defending under a reservation of rights, the insurer
sought a declaration of no coverage and duty to defend, arguing that the
insured failed to provide timely notice per the policy which required
notice "as soon as practicable of an 'occurrence' or an offense which may
result in a claim."' The insured responded that it was excused from
earlier notice because it believed the injury was covered by the
subcontractor's workers' compensation insurance, and it would not be
liable.26
The court rejected the insured's argument, reasoning that its
subjective belief was not controlling, and a duty to provide notice was
triggered when the insured actually knew or objectively should have
known of the possibility that it might be held liable for the injury,"
The court granted the insurer's motion for summary judgment on its
declaratory judgment claim.
The opinion in JNJFoundation Specialists,Inc. v. D.R. Horton, Inc.29
may be cited by insureds for the relevance of prejudice to the insurer in
late-notice cases. The plaintiff driver sued a developer and another
driver that rear-ended the plaintiff for injuries allegedly resulting in
part from the developer's failure to adequately mark the closure of a
traffic lane in connection with sidewalk construction."0 As an additional insured, the developer filed third-party claims for defense and
coverage against the sidewalk subcontractor's insurer.8 ' The insurer
sought summary judgment, arguing in part that the developer had failed
to "[ilmmediately" forward the plaintiff's suit to the insurer as required
by the policy. 2 Affirming the denial of that motion, the court stated
that, although the insurer was not required to show prejudice from the
late forwarding, the insurer's failure to demonstrate prejudice may be
considered in deciding whether the developer's delay was reasonable
under the circumstances. 33

24. Id. at 1370.
25. Id. at 1369.
26. Id. at 1370.
27. Id. at 1371-72.
28. Id. at 1378.
29. 311 Ga. App. 269, 717 S.E.2d 219 (2011).
30. Id. at 269, 717 S.E.2d at 221-22.
31. Id. at 269, 719 S.E.2d at 222. The developer also asserted claims against other
third-party defendants. Id.
32. Id. at 273, 719 S.E.2d at 224.
33. Id. at 275-76, 719 S.E.2d at 226.
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IV. FRAUD
Challenges associated with seeking rescission for fraud are apparent
in Novare Group, Inc. v. Sarif The purchasers of condominium units
sued the developers and brokers, asserting, among other claims, fraud,
negligent misrepresentation, and violation of the Georgia Fair Business
Practices Act,' based on alleged misrepresentations by the developers'
brokers that views from the units would not be blocked by later
development. The purchasers alleged that when these representations
were made, the developers had already planned a project across the
street that would block their views.86
The trial court granted the defendants' motion for judgment on the
pleadings as to all claims. The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court's order.3 7 The Georgia Supreme Court held that the trial
court properly granted the motion and reversed the court of appeals.'
The supreme court explained that, as a general rule, a party alleging
fraudulent inducement of a contract may either: "(1) affirm the contract
and sue for damages from the fraud or breach; or (2) promptly rescind
the contract" before suing for fraud.39 Because the purchasers
simultaneously fied suit and sought to rescind the contract, the court
40
held that they did not properly rescind their purchase agreements.
The court also held that they lacked grounds for rescission because the
alleged misrepresentations related to future promises and were directly
contradicted by the purchase agreements, which "expressly state [d] that
the views may change over time, oral representations of the sellers could
not be relied upon," the purchasers had not relied on oral representations by the brokers, and the agreement included all terms.4
V

INDEMNIFICATION

In Kennedy Development Co. v. Camp,42 nearby property owners sued
the subdivision developer for increased stormwater runoff from the
subdivision. 43 Thereafter, the developer and the subdivisions home-

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

290 Ga. 186, 186-87, 718 S.E.2d 304, 306-07 (2011).
O.C.G.A. §§ 10-1-390 to -407 (2010).
Novare Grp., Inc., 290 Ga. at 186-87, 718 S.E.2d at 306-07.
Id. at 187, 718 S.E.2d at 307.
Id. at 191, 718 S.E.2d at 310.
Id. at 188, 718 S.E.2d at 307.
Id. at 188, 718 S.E.2d at 307-08.
Id. at 189, 718 S.E.2d at 308.
290 Ga. 257, 719 S.E.2d 442 (2011).
Id. at 257, 719 S.E.2d at 443.
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owners' association entered into an assignment and assumption
agreement under which the association agreed to indemnify and defend
the developer against "any and all" claims relating to the "construction,
maintenance, repair, or operation of' the subdivision and other
matters. 4" The developer then filed a third-party complaint for
indemnification and defense against the association based on the
indemnification provision. The association responded that the indemnification provision was invalid under45 section 13-8-2(b) of the Official Code
of Georgia Annotated (O.G.C.A.).
The key question addressed by the Georgia Supreme Court was
whether the indemnification provision related to "construction, alteration, repair, or maintenance," and was therefore covered by O.C.G.A.
§ 13-8-2(b).46 At the time that the assignment and assumption
agreement was executed, that subsection stated as follows:
A covenant, promise, agreement, or understanding in or in connection
with or collateral to a contract or agreement relative to the construction, alteration, repair, or maintenance of a building structure,
appurtenances, and appliances, including moving, demolition, and
excavating connected therewith, purporting to indemnify or hold
harmless the promisee against liability for damages arising out of
bodily injury to persons or damage to property caused by or resulting
from the sole negligence of the promisee, his agents or employees, or
indemnitee is against public policy and is void and unenforceable,
provided that this subsection shall not affect the validity of any
insurance contract, workers' compensation, or agreement issued by an
admitted insurer.4
The court held that the assignment and assumption agreement clearly
related to "construction, alteration, repair, or maintenance," and was
therefore covered by O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b), even though that agreement
did not itself include terms of a construction project, because the
agreement was a vehicle through which the association assumed existing
maintenance and repair responsibilities of the developer for past
construction. 48 Significantly, the court rejected the developer's argument that O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b) applied only to contracts for future
construction and not to ones for completed construction.49

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 257-58, 719 S.E.2d at 443-44.
Id. at 258, 719 S.E.2d at 444; see O.C.GA § 13-8-2(b) (2010 & Supp. 2012).
Kennedy Dev. Co., 290 Ga. at 259, 719 S.E.2d at 444; see also O.C.GA. § 13-8-2(b).
Id.
Kennedy Dev. Co., 290 Ga. at 260, 719 S.E.2d at 445; see O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b).
Kennedy Dev. Co., 290 Ga. at 260 n.3, 719 S.E.2d at 445 n.3.
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In JNJ Foundation Specialists, Inc. v. D.R. Horton, Inc.,5° the
plaintiff driver sued a developer and another driver that rear-ended the
plaintiff, claiming the developer's failure to properly indicate a lane
closure due to sidewalk construction partially caused the plaintiffs
injuries.5 The developer filed third-party claims for indemnification
and defense against its sidewalk subcontractor.52 The Georgia Court
of Appeals considered the trial court's rulings on cross-motions for
summary judgment between the developer and the third-party defen53
dants.
The sidewalk subcontractor's subcontract required it to defend and
indemnify the developer for any claims "in any way occurring, incident
to, arising out of, or in connection with ...the work performed or to be
performed by contractor .... '
The court rejected the sidewalk
subcontractor's argument that "arising out of," as used in indemnity
provisions, required a showing that the sidewalk subcontractor's actions
were the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.5 In affirming the
grant of summary judgment to the developer on its claims against the
sidewalk subcontractor, the court said instead that "[a]lmost any causal
connection or relationship will do."56
VI.

STATUTE OF REPOSE

In Wilhelm v. Houston County,5 7 seeking damages from a malfunctioning septic system, a homeowner sued a builder, Houston County, and
the county health department for fraudulent concealment.5" The suit
was filed more than eight years after the plaintiff purchased the
house.59
The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment to the defendants based on the construction-related
statute of repose at O.C.G.A. § 9-3-51.60 The court noted that, although

50. 311 Ga. App. 269, 717 S.E.2d 219(2011). For an additional discussion of this case,
see supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.

51.
52.
53.
54.

JNJ, 311 Ga. App. at 269, 717 S.E.2d at 221-22.
Id. at 269, 717 S.E.2d at 222.
Id.
Id. at 270, 717 S.E.2d at 222.

55. Id. (quoting BBL-McCarthy, LLC v. Baldwin Paving Co., 285 Ga. App. 494,498,646
S.E.2d 682, 686 (2007)).

56. Id.
57. 310 Ga. App. 506, 713 S.E.2d 660 (2011).
58. Id. at 506-07, 713 S.E.2d at 661-62. The plaintiff also asserted a nuisance claim.
Id.
59. Id. at 507-08, 713 S.E.2d at 662-63.
60. Id. at 510-11, 713 S.E.2d at 663, 665; see O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.2(a) (2002).
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the plaintiff asserted a fraud claim and O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96 may toll the
statute 61of limitation for fraud, § 9-3-96 does not toll this statute of
repose.

The court also noted, however, that "a defendant may be equitably
estopped from raising the defense of the statute of repose if the plaintiff
reasonably relied on a fraudulent act or statement by the defendant that
occurred after the plaintiff's injury accrued" and that led plaintiff to
delay filing suit until the expiration of the statute of repose. 2 In this
case, the court concluded, there was no evidence of a fraudulent act or
statement after the plaintiff's purchase of the house.63
VII.

MECHANICS' AND MATERIALMEN'S LIENS

In Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Lafarge Building Materials,
Inc.,' a supplier sued a general contractor and surety on a materialmen's lien discharge bond for the price of materials the supplier provided
to a subcontractor for a project. 5 The general contractor and surety
moved for summary judgment on the ground that the supplier had not
provided a Notice to Contractor in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 44-14361.5(a) and (c).66 In response, the supplier argued that it was excused
from providing a Notice to Contractor because the general contractor's
mandatory Notice of Commencement, per O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.5(b) and
(d), was fatally deficient in that it failed to include the general contractor's telephone number.67
The Georgia Court of Appeals reasoned that, while it is clear from
O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.5(d) that if no Notice of Commencement had been
fied the supplier would have been excused from providing a Notice to
Contractor, it is not clear from O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.5 whether the same
result follows where, as here, a Notice of Commencement was filed, but
it contained less than all of the required information.6
The court stated that, generally, exact compliance with statutory
language is not necessary, but instead only substantial compliance
addressing all essential requirements of a statute is required. 9 It

61. Wilhelm, 310 Ga. App. at 509, 713 S.E.2d at 663; O.C.GA. § 9-3-96 (2007).
62. Wilhelm, 310 Ga. App. at 509, 713 S.E.2d at 663 (citing Esener v. Kinsey, 240 Ga.
App. 21, 22-24, 522 S.E.2d 522, 524 (1999)) (emphasis omitted).
63. Id. at 510, 713 S.E.2d at 663.
64. 312 Ga. App. 821, 720 S.E.2d 288 (2011).
65. Id. at 821, 720 S.E.2d at 289.
66. Id. at 821-22, 720 S.E.2d at 289; O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.5 (2002 & Supp. 2012).
67. Fidelity, 312 Ga. App. at 822, 720 S.E.2d at 289-90.
68. Id. at 823-25, 720 S.E.2d at 290-91.
69. Id. at 823, 720 S.E.2d at 290.
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70
noted that in General Electric Co. v. North Point Ministries, Inc., the

court held that the name of the true owner of property and the legal
description of that property were essential requirements of a Notice of
Commencement, while in Rey Coliman Contractors, Inc. v. PCL
Construction Services, Inc.," it concluded that the failure to timely file
the Notice of Commencement and to post it at the worksite were not
essential requirements.7 2 Guided by those cases, and given that lien
statutes must be construed in favor of the property owner and against
the lien claimant, the court held that the absence of a telephone number
was not an essential requirement because it presented merely a
potential inconvenience to a supplier trying to fie a lien. 3
74
In Dan J. Sheehan Co. v. Fairlawnon Jones Homeowners' Assn, a
contractor performed stucco repair work on some parts of a condominium
complex. After discovering interior water and termite damage that
destroyed wooden support beams and studs in some units, the contractor
performed additional repair work that was not initially contemplated.
The contractor sent a bill to the condominium association, which did not
pay it. According to the court of appeals opinion, the contractor then
filed liens against the association's property7 5 and some individual
units.76 Thereafter, the contractor filed the subject lawsuit against the
association and certain unit owners.77
The contractor moved for partial summary judgment on its suit on
account and breach of contract claims against the association. The trial
court denied that motion because there were issues of fact about whether
a contract and Whether the parties had assented to its
there was
7
terms.
The contractor moved for partial summary judgment on its foreclosure
of lien claim against the association and defendant unit owners. The
unit owners filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment on that
claim and the contractor's claim for unjust enrichment. The trial court

70. 289 Ga. App. 382, 657 S.E.2d 297 (2008).
71. 296 Ga. App. 892, 676 S.E.2d 298 (2009).
72. Fidelity, 312 Ga. App. at 825, 720 S.E.2d at 291.
73. Id. at 825, 720 S.E.2d at 291-92.
74. 312 Ga. App. 787, 720 S.E.2d 259 (2011).
75. The reference to association's property is confusing because generally condominium
associations do not own property. The common elements of condominiums are owned in
undivided shares by the unit owners. See generally O.C.G.A § 44-3-95 (2010) for rules
relating to mechanics' and materialmen's liens against common elements and units of
condominium projects.
76. Dan J. Sheehan Co., 312 Ga. App. at 787-88, 720 S.E.2d at 261.
77. Id. at 788, 720 S.E.2d at 261.
78. Id.
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denied the contractor's motion and granted the unit owners' motion. The
contractor appealed these rulings.79
The court of appeals began its analysis by stating that to prevail on
its lien foreclosure claim against the unit owners, the contractor had to
prove either that it had a contract with them or that the unit owners
had consented to a contract under which improvements were made.80
Affirming the trial court, the coirt stated that "there [was] no finding
that a contract existed" between the contractor and the association and
"no showing that the unit owners had consented to" such a contract
(assuming it existed), as opposed to merely 81
consenting to the work that
the contractor performed on their property.
In Georgia Primary Bank v. Atlanta Paving, Inc., 2 a subcontractor
provided labor and materials to a general contractor for use on the
owner's property. Thereafter, a bank closed on a loan to the owner. The
loan funds were to be used to fund additional construction and to pay off
another loan.'
After the loan closing, but before the bank recorded its security deed,
the subcontractor recorded its mechanics' and materialmen's lien. The
subcontractor obtained a consent judgment against the general
contractor for the debt and then filed the subject lien foreclosure action.
The bank intervened, claiming its security deed had priority over the
subcontractor's lien. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor
of the subcontractor, and the bank appealed."
On appeal, the court first held that the lien was superior to the
security deed because it had been recorded first.8 5 Then, it addressed
the bank's contention that a contractor's affidavit signed by the general
contractor at the loan closing dissolved the lien under O.C.G.A. § 44-14361.2(a). 8 The court held that the affidavit was invalid as a dissolution affidavit because it merely stated that potential lien claimants had
been "or will be" paid with amounts mentioned in the affidavit that
would be received by the general contractor.8 7 It did not state, as
required by O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.2(a), that "the agreed price or

79. Id. at 789, 720 S.E.2d at 261.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 789-90, 720 S.E.2d at 262.
Id. at 790, 720 S.E.2d at 262.
309 Ga. App. 851, 711 S.E.2d 409 (2011).
Id. at 851, 711 S.E.2d at 409-10.
Id. at 851-53, 711 S.E.2d at 410.
Id. at 854, 711 S.E.2d at 411.
Id. at 854-55, 711 S.E.2d at 411-12.
Id. at 855, 711 S.E.2d at 412.
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reasonable value of the labor, services, or materials has been paid or
waived in writing by the lien claimant." 8
VIII.

ARBITRATION

In Riddick v. Williams & Bowling Developers, LLC, 9 homeowners
sued a builder entity and its principals for construction issues. The trial
court compelled arbitration. The arbitrator issued an award on April 7,
2007, in favor of the homeowners and against the builder entity. No
damages were awarded against the principals. On April 21, 2008,
slightly more than a year after the award, the trial court directed the
parties to seek clarification about whether the arbitrator had considered
the homeowners' claims against the principals. The arbitrator responded
that it had considered and rejected those claims. That response, dated
May 28, 2008, was apparently not received by the parties until May 6,
2009.90
On January 7, 2010, which was thirty-three months after the award,
the homeowners filed a motion to confirm the arbitrator's award. The
trial court denied the motion as untimely. The homeowners appealed. 9'
The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, citing O.C.G.A.
§ 9-9-12, which states, in relevant part, that "[t]he [trial] court shall
confirm an award upon application of a party made within one year after
its delivery to him, unless the award is vacated or modified by the court
.....
According to the court, the timely filing of an application for
confirmation is a prerequisite to confirmation. 93

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 855, 711 S.E.2d at 411-12; see also O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.2.
311 Ga. App. 666, 716 S.E.2d 776 (2011).
Id. at 666, 716 S.E.2d at 776-77.
Id. at 666, 716 S.E.2d at 777.
Id. at 667, 716 S.E.2d at 777 (alteration in original); see also O.C.G.A. § 9-9-12

(2007).

93. Riddick, 311 Ga. App. at 667, 716 S.E.2d at 777.

